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The freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a 
fidelity with regard to promises.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Businesspeople need contractual assurance. Most transactions are 
less straightforward than a cash sale of an easily identifiable item. 
Buyers need assurance of the quality of what they are purchasing, and 
sellers need assurance that bills will be paid. The legal system may not 
always be available to provide contractual assurance - and when the 
law is dysfunctional, private order might arise in its place. 
Many developing and transition economies have dysfunctional le­
gal systems, either because the laws do not exist or because the ma­
chinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such countries, bilateral 
relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market inter­
mediaries may work in place of the legal system.2 In this Article, we 
use data obtained from surveys of firms in five transition economies in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as Vietnam to 
show that, at least in these economies, social networks and informal 
gossip substitute for the formal legal system, while business networks 
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court enforcement or because the transaction costs of using private order are smaller than 
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and trade associations work in conjunction with it.3 These transition 
countries provide an informative place to examine the interaction be­
tween the formal legal system and private-order mechanisms because 
both are in a state of flux. Although market-oriented laws have begun 
to replace the bureaucratic controls of the old planned economy, pri­
vate firms' access to the courts varies, from almost no access in 
Vietnam to considerable access in Poland and Romania. Even within 
these countries, the transitional state of the legal system means that 
managers vary in their perceptions of the courts' usefulness, and ulti­
mately it is their willingness or unwillingness to utilize the formal legal 
system that shapes the development of private order.4 �ecause the 
data from these economies contain more variation than would be 
found in a steady-state economy, we can run meaningful regressions 
relating firms' behavior to their perceptions of the courts' workability. 
Many types of private-order mechanisms arise in market econo­
mies. Sometimes parties directly involved in the transaction arrange 
the private order. For example, if a buyer is locked in with a particu­
lar seller, either because the seller is a monopolist or because the 
buyer would face high costs of locating an alternative seller, the seller 
can make the contract self-enforcing by cutting off further dealings. 
Self-enforcement in these lock-in situations sometimes takes more 
imaginative forms. A New York cable television company, Paragon 
Cable, has a novel strategy to get its customers to pay their overdue 
bills.5 It does not unhook the cable. Instead, using what is supposedly 
a far more effective bill-collection measure, Paragon runs C-SPAN, 
with its political speeches, debates, and hearings, on all seventy-seven 
channels. 
In close-knit communities, where people interact \vith each other 
frequently and information flows freely, people may adhere to social 
norms of cooperation because it is in their long-term interest to do so. 
For example, this type of relational contracting has arisen spontane­
ously within groups such as whalers and neighboring cattle farmers, as 
Robert Ellickson has shown.6 In Asia, especially among the ethnic 
Chinese, contracting typically rests on personal relationships, or 
3. The surveys in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were done in collabora­
tion with Simon Johnson. They are described in more detail in Simon Johnson et al., Entre­
preneurs and the Ordering of Institutional Refonn: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine Compared, 8:1 ECON. TRANsmoN 1 {2000) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Entrepre­
neurs]. 
4. We asked our survey respondents (managers of recently started firms) whether they 
believed they could use the courts to enforce contracts with customers or suppliers. In 
Vietnam, just 9% said they could. In Romania, 87% said the courts were usable, in Poland 
73%, in Slovakia 68%, in Russia 56%, and in Ukraine 55%. 
5. See Telecommunications Policy Review 8 October 1995, p. 9. 
6. See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOlITLA w {1991). 
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guanxi.1 In Japan, according to Ronald Dore, firms' opportunism is 
limited by "moralized trading relationships of mutual goodwill. The 
stability of the relationship is the key. Both sides recognize an obliga­
tion to try to maintain it. "8 
In the right circumstances, then, private order can be achieved 
spontaneously. In large, anonymous communities, however, where 
people can enter and leave and where alternative trading partners are 
readily accessible, spontaneous private order may not be feasible. 
Anonymity strips reputational constraints of their power; more is 
needed than social norms or self-enforcing dealings. Private order, if 
it is to operate at all, needs to be organized. 
Market participants thus sometimes form themselves into groups 
such as trade associations to support contracting and create private 
order. Profit-seeking firms also sometimes provide private order: 
market intermediaries such as wholesalers and trading companies on 
occasion supply, among other services, contractual assurance for buy­
ers and sellers. We argue below that private-order organizations of 
either kind have two roles in sustaining contracting: first, providing 
information about breaches, and second, organizing the responses to 
those breaches. Historical studies of notably diverse settings, from 
medieval Europe to present-day Mexico, demonstrate a consistency in 
this functioning of private-order organizations: a private organization 
(such as a market intermediary or a trade association) disseminates in­
formation about contractual breaches, and then coordinates the com­
munity's response to them. The usual sanction is to boycott the of­
fender. These private-order organizations provide contract­
enforcement mechanisms that lie between formal, state-supported or­
der and informal, spontaneous order. 
Private order unfortunately also has a down side. It sometimes 
harms efficiency by excluding new entrants from trading or by 
achieving price collusion. Private order also can cause or perpetuate 
racial or gender discrimination. Additionally, some private-order or­
ganizations' enforcement techniques overflow into criminal violence. 
Because of these disadvantages, private order can usefully supplement 
public law, but cannot replace it. 
· 
Our evidence comes from two sources. First, we review published 
descriptions of private-order practices in various countries. In re­
viewing this anecdotal evidence we aim to show how similar private­
order mechanisms have arisen in quite diverse settings, from medieval 
Europe to present-day Mexico. Second, we analyze data from the sur­
veys of entrepreneurs we conducted in countries in the process of 
transition to a market economy from central planning: Vietnam, 
7. See Yao Souchou, The Fetish of Relationships: Chinese Business Transactions in 
Singapore, SOJOURN 2, 1, 89-111 (1987). 
8. RONALD DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY 173 (1987). 
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Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland. In using this sta­
tistical evidence, we aim to examine, in depth, how the legal system 
affects the operation of private-order mechanisms, both spontaneous 
and organized. 
In Part I, we discuss why private order is needed and why it some­
times needs to be organized, and argue that private organizations 
serve two functions - to disseminate information about contractual 
breaches and to coordinate the responses of multiple parties. We then 
provide evidence in Part II to demonstrate when private order works 
spontaneously and when it does not. In Part III, we present evidence 
regarding the information provision and coordination roles of private­
order organizations. In Part IV, we discuss evidence demonstrating 
how private-order mechanisms interact with the formal legal system. 
We conclude in Part V with a discussion of the downside of private 
order, and argue consequently that public order sometimes is prefer­
able to private order. 
I. REPEATED GAMES AND THE LAW 
In this Part, we describe the role and emergence of relational, in­
formal contracting (private order) in relation to the relative adequacy 
of the existing legal system (public order). As a preliminary matter, 
we then describe the different types of private order (spontaneous and 
organized), the functioning of each, and, correlatively, when each type 
arises. In the subsequent parts, we explore more fully when and how 
these two types of private order function. 
A. The Law versus Relational Contracting 
Many business dealings have the character of the prisoner's di­
lemma. A seller can cheat by supplying inferior merchandise, and a 
buyer can cheat by not paying its bills. The best outcome for both, of 
course, is that neither cheats. In an isolated transaction, however, 
both parties may have an incentive to cheat, leading to an outcome 
that benefits neither. 
There are two ways to counter the self-defeating incentives of the 
prisoner's dilemma. One is the law. If the players can write binding 
contracts in advance promising not to cheat, with a sufficiently severe 
sanction for cheating, then it is rational not to cheat. The other coun­
termeasure arises from repetition of the game, or relational contract­
ing. Players may refrain from squeezing the last cent out of the cur­
rent deal because they wish to do business in the future, either with 
this particular trading partner or with others who could learn of this 
behavior. Contracting thus becomes self-enforcing through the threat 
of retaliation and consequent loss of business. In other words, the 
shadow of the future can induce the trading partners to cooperate. 
August 2000] Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order 2425 
If the legal system functioned perfectly, contracts would never 
need to be self-enforcing. A frictionless legal system would always 
work at least as well as relational contracting. In practice, however, 
laws meant to provide contractual assurance sometimes do not exist, 
and even when they exist, their application and enforcement may not 
be cost-effective or even possible. 
Some countries, especially developing and transition countries, 
have inadequate legal systems. Writing good laws does not automati­
cally solve the problem, for it takes years to create the institutions of a 
functioning court system and to train judges and lawyers. Indeed, in 
some countries rampant corruption renders the courts entirely unreli­
able. 
Even in countries with sophisticated legal systems, the law may not 
work smoothly. For example, the transaction costs of appealing to the 
law sometimes exceed the transaction costs of using relational con­
tracting. Market participants have some advantages over judges in de­
ciding whether commitments have been fulfilled.9 First, market par­
ticipants possess greater expertise than courts in the monitoring of 
other participants' conduct. Second, their decisions and actions can be 
more nuanced than the binary decision that a court must make - that 
of liability or no liability.10 Third, they can consider information that 
cannot be introduced in court, such as impressionistic evidence about 
business trends or judgments about the quality of items sold. They can 
base their decisions on a firm's behavior over time, on probabilistic 
patterns that would not be admissible evidence in court. 
In countries with functioning legal systems, then, relational con­
tracting can supplement the law by mitigating the transaction costs of 
investigation and enforcement. In countries with dysfunctional legal 
systems, on the other hand, relational contracting may replace the law 
altogether. We shall investigate both situations.11 
B. Spontaneous versus Organized Contracting 
The size of a community and the adequacy of existing market insti­
tutions influences whether spontaneous order can arise, or whether 
9. See David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373, 415-17 (1990). There are, of course, good reasons why certain kinds of evidence 
are inadmissible. A cost of achieving the economic efficiencies that, on average, such prob­
abilistic evidence produces is that sometimes in specific instances the outcome is unjust. The 
law is designed to avoid specific injustices more than to produce outcomes that on average 
promote efficiency. 
10. For example, a finding of liability in one lawsuit may not have the same far-reaching 
effects of a boycott by other market players, or of consequently restrained or narrowly tai­
lored dealings with a party found guilty of breach. 
11. See infra Part IV. 
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spontaneous order is rendered ineffective and the order must there­
fore be organized. 
1. Spontaneous Contracting 
If a buyer and seller expect to deal with each other repeatedly, 
each might refrain from cheating the other in order to maintain the 
relationship. Whether the prospect of future business suffices to over­
come the immediate incentive to cheat depends on the value attached 
to any future returns. For cooperation to be consistent with self­
interest, the interactions must be sufficiently frequent and future re­
turns must not be discounted too heavily. 
Spontaneous cooperation between two trading partners also re­
quires them to be locked in with each other. If the buyer can easily 
find another seller to deal with, the seller's threat to cut off future 
business carries little weight.12 On the other hand, if firms are locked 
in with their current trading partners, perhaps because they trade a 
unique product or because of the difficulty of locating alternative 
trading partners, the firms will make efforts to sustain their existing 
relationships. This implies, incidentally, that spontaneous cooperation 
is easier to achieve when market institutions are inadequate. Lock-in 
prevails in underdeveloped economies with poor market information 
or high transport costs. As the economy develops and market frictions 
fall, the cost of breaking a relationship will also fall and firms will be­
come less willing to cooperate with each other. Thus, more sophisti­
cated economies can rely less on this type of spontaneous, lock-in rela­
tional contracting. 
2. Organized Relational Contracting 
If no lock-in exists and the two parties deal with each other only 
infrequently, then cooperation will not further their interests. The 
shadow of the future can still come into play in such a situation, how­
ever, if the retaliation for a breach comes not only from the affected 
party but also from other firms - that is, if community sanctions ap­
ply.13 A firm will more likely pay its bills if it knows that its other 
trading partners, current or potential, would otherwise refuse to do 
business with it. 
12 See Rachel Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 89 AM. ECON. 
REV. 830 (1996) for a model of the effects of lock-in on cooperation. 
13. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 {1993) [hereinafter Greif, Contract 
Enforceability]; Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical 
and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL ECON. 912 
(1994); Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON. 
STIJD. 63 (1992). 
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Although community sanctions sometimes can be invoked sponta­
neously, they often need to be managed.14 For example, even in mar­
kets with adequate information flow, the sheer size of the market may 
mean that some players may not even learn about third-party contrac­
tual breaches, and therefore not know when to enact sanctions. Or, 
even where informational problems do not exist, the application of dif­
ferential sanctions by uncoordinated market players may provide outs 
for the breacher. In these situations, community sanctions do not 
work without formal organization. This organization might be an in­
dependent third party, such as a wholesaler or some other kind of 
market intermediary, or it might be the firms themselves in combina­
tion, like a trade association. These organizations serve to provide 
both information about breaches and coordination of the community 
response. 
a. Providing Information. As a first matter, then, the enactment of 
community sanctions requires the provision of information because 
firms must know when a breach has occurred and who caused it. Pri­
vate organizations can serve as convenient and effective repositories 
of this information. In addition, by providing formal channels of 
communication, an organization can reduce the likelihood of mistakes 
in the transmission of this information. As anyone who has played the 
children's "telephone game" can attest, stories change when they are 
orally transmitted through a chain of people.15 As a result, reliable in­
formation transmission depends on having only a few links between 
the original source of the information and each recipient. This would 
require every member of the group to communicate frequently with 
every other member. This type of spontaneous communication may 
be unlikely or even impossible in a large group, and organizations 
therefore provide the most reliable means of information transmis­
sion.16 These organizations may take the form of trade associations 
formed by the actual market players, or of market intermediaries, such 
as wholesalers. 
14. We posit here that organized private order arises when market characteristics fore­
close effective functioning (or even development) of spontaneous order. Of course, there 
are situations where organized private order exists but may be dysfunctional, see infra Sec­
tion II.A, and market players therefore revert to (or maintain) spontaneous order as the 
primary mechanism for enforcing contracts. This phenomenon is unsurprising when one 
considers the existence of private order in the face of an existing but dysfunctional formal 
legal system. 
15. In the telephone game, a long sentence is whispered from one person to another in a 
group. The second person repeats the sentence to a third, the third to a fourth, and so on, 
until everyone has heard the sentence. The last member then repeats what he or she heard, 
usually uttering a sentence entirely unrelated to the original. On the idea that a formal or­
ganizational structure reduces the likelihood of mistakes, see Joel Sobel, How to Count to 
One Thousand, 102 ECON. J. 1 (1992). 
16. This problem with the transmission of information provides another explanation for 
the inability of relational contracting to be effective in larger groups. 
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A trade association can effectively serve as a repository of infor­
mation. A buyer, say, considering dealing with a new seller can go to 
the information repository and check whether the seller has a history 
of reneging on deals. In addition, a trustworthy party may be needed 
to investigate any reports of cheating and assess which party to the 
transaction actually cheated. A trade association (or other type of in­
formation provider) can perform this task, and can also check the ve­
racity of the offended firm's claim that it has been cheated (for exam­
ple, claims of unpaid debts or delivery of low-quality goods). 
Otherwise, sellers could use the threat of reporting to hold up inno­
cent buyers, or vice versa.17 
In the examples provided below,18 we will show that trade associa­
tions must inspect their own members as well as those on the other 
side of the transaction. If they imperfectly police their own membersj 
then those members may use the threat of multilateral sanctions in 
bargaining with their customers, thus undermining their own incen­
tives. The key lies in verification of the claims of cheating. Having 
verified, the organization might just publicize the cheating, or it might 
take a more active role in generating punishment by community sanc­
tions or some other route. 
A wholesaler or market intermediary that deals with several cus­
tomers can also have an effect similar to that of an information reposi­
tory. If a seller produces a low-quality item, it risks losing not just the 
customer who bought the good, but also other customers, if the whole­
saler that handled the purchase ceases dealing with the seller. In addi­
tion, if the wholesaler stocks multiple product lines, it has an incentive 
to drop a reneging seller; otherwise its own reputation will suffer, with 
consequent loss of sales in its other product Iines.19 
Moreover, the benefit of intermediaries as information-providets 
goes beyond the implementation of community sanctions. By in­
specting the quality of a product and certifying it, intermediaries re­
solve problems generated by asymmetric information about trading 
partners' capabilities. The fact that intermediaries are prominent in 
the marketplace and themselves have a reputation to maintain gives 
them an incentive to carry out this certification honestly. Trading 
through intermediaries generates a better match of buyers to sellers 
than does unintermediated trade.20 If the intermediary is a monopo-
17. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. LJ. 
2225, 2267-69 {1999); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: 
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL 21 {1990) re· 
printed in REPUTATION 243 {Daniel B. Klein ed., 1994). 
18. See infra notes 74 to 80 and accompanying text. 
19. See Gary Biglaiser & James Friedman, Middlemen as Guarantors of Quality, 12 
INI"LJ. INDUS. ORG. 509 {1994). 
20. See Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman, Adverse Selection with Competitive In· 
spection, 8 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 {Spring 1999). 
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list, this information provision and certification role may be attenu­
ated; the monopolist might choose to reveal only partial information. 
If sufficient competition exists among intermediaries, on the other 
hand, complete information might be revealed.21 
b. Coordination of Community Response. As well as information, 
coordination is sometimes needed in enacting community sanctions. 
Information and coordination are separable in principle though not in 
practice: without information, coordination obviously cannot occur. 
For private order to work, the issue is whether it suffices for market 
participants to be informed of a breach, or whether, in addition, effec­
tive sanctioning requires some coordination of their responses. 
Coordination has two aspects. First, the repeated game has multi­
ple equilibria; as in the standard prisoner's dilemma, many different 
outcomes are consistent with everyone behaving rationally. Coopera­
tion supported by the threat of community sanctions is not the only 
possible outcome. Another equilibrium has everyone cheating. This 
rests on a self-confirming prophecy: each player expects everyone else 
to cheat, so each cheats, and everyone's expectations are fulfilled. An 
effective initiation of cooperation faces an obstacle: it does not pay to 
act in a trustworthy way unless you believe that everyone else will act 
in a trustworthy way. Escape from an untrusting equilibrium requires 
everyone to change his beliefs about others, and his own behavior, si­
multaneously. Such a coordinated change is unlikely to occur sponta­
neously if there is more than a handful of players; someone will have 
to organize it. 
Moreover, because most economic interactions can be more com­
plicated than the standard prisoner's dilemma, there is an aspect to 
this multiplicity of equilibria beyond the issue of achieving cooperative 
outcomes. Complicated economic interactions indeed have a range of 
efficient outcomes that can be achieved. So in addition to achieving 
cooperation, there must also be a resolution of the issue of how to 
share the gains from that cooperation. Squabbling over the division of 
the spoils frequently causes agreements to break down. By developing 
customary rules to govern exchanges, and perhaps even by offering 
formal arbitration procedures, an organization can help prevent these 
costly bargaining breakdowns. 
The second aspect of coordination involves the resolution of the 
free-rider problem. After a seller has cheated a buyer, other potential 
buyers may have little incentive to join in the sanctioning of the 
cheater. It furthers each individual's interest to let bygones be by­
gones.22 But if all do that, there is no sanction. A formal organization 
21. See Alessandro Lizzeri, Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries, 30 
RAND J. ECON. 214 (1999). 
22 See Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56 
ECONOMETRICA383 (1988). 
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may be needed to provide the discipline to prevent this free-riding 
over punishment. 
How, then, do private-order organizations address these two 
problems? Organized private order means that any individual trader 
need not have frequent (or any) contact with any other particular 
trader in order for reliable information to be transmitted between the 
two. Hence, more open groups are workable. Furthermore, an or­
ganization increases the force of economic sanctions because it elimi­
nates the need for future dealings to occur between any single pair of 
traders. To sustain cooperation it is only necessary that a firm foresee 
future dealings with some members of the group. 
II. WHEN SPONTANEOUS ORDER DOES, AND DOES NOT, WORK 
Spontaneous cooperation may arise between two transactors or 
among many. In this Part, we review anecdotal and empirical evi­
dence on bilateral relational contracting. 
A. Bilateral Relational Contracting 
Long-term bilateral relations are pervasive in less-developed coun­
tries. In Moroccan bazaars, for example, the lack of an organized 
market for information means that the "search for information one 
lacks and the protection of information one has is the name of the 
game."23 The result is a "clientalization" of the market where, for the 
sake of assurance against being cheated, buyers habitually return to 
the sellers they know, even if other sellers offer lower prices. In rural 
Thailand, rice and rubber are marketed in different ways.24 Rice is 
sold in impersonal auction markets, while rubber is traded via long­
standing bilateral relationships between growers and buyers. The dif­
ference between these two formats lies in the ability of the buyer to 
assess the quality of the product. Whereas a buyer can immediately 
assess the quality of rice, the quality of rubber becomes apparent only 
several months later when it is processed. The buyer must trust the 
grower to have carefully removed impurities; this trust rests on the 
relationship.25 
Vietnam's transitional economy provides a stringent test of the 
workability of spontaneous private order because the legal system is 
inadequate (or at least is perceived as such by market players) and the 
economy is not yet far enough developed for private-order organiza-
23. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Market­
ing, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 28-30 (1978). 
24. See Ammar Siamwalla, Farmers and Middlemen: Aspects of Agricultural Marketing 
in Thailand, 29 ECON. BULL. FORAsIA& PAC 38, 41-44 (1978). 
25. See id. at 44. 
August2000] Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order 2431 
tions to have been built. A survey of managers of small start-up firms 
in Vietnam we conducted in 1995 showed the inadequacy of formal 
contract-supporting institutions, both public and private.26 The man­
agers we interviewed said that they did not believe the courts could 
help them. "They normally just create more problems," said one.27 
"[I]n Vietnam no one believes we have a good legal system."28 Ac­
cording to another, "[t]he court is weak and no entrepreneurs use it."29 
In responding to the inquiry on whether third parties exist that can en­
force agreements with customers or suppliers, only 9% of those inter­
viewed thought that a court or other government agency could help.30 
Third parties provide even less help for disputes over the quality of 
goods; only 2% of the managers said they would take such disputes to 
court or appeal to local authorities.31 Moreover, trade associations do 
not seem to play a major contracting role. While 47% of the surveyed 
firms belong to a trade association, only 28% of these (or 13% of the 
total) say that the association provides "information about the trust­
worthiness of customers or suppliers," and only 13 % (or 6% of the to­
tal) say that the association provides "contract and/or dispute resolu­
tion."32 Most deals among Vietnam's firms, therefore, rest on 
unorganized bilateral relational contracting. 
Because bilateral relationships require some degree of lock-in be­
tween the two parties,33 our survey also asked a series of questions 
about the surveyed firms' first and newest customer relationship.34 
These data provide evidence regarding the relevance of customer 
lock-in for relational contracting. Using, as our measure of lock-in, 
the number of sellers of similar products located within one kilometer 
of the seller in question, we found that a seller's willingness to grant 
trade credit to a customer is significantly related to the buyer's degree 
of lock-in. A seller that has competitors nearby offers its customers 
about fifteen percentage points less trade credit than one with no 
nearby competitors.35 
26. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in 
Vietnam, 15 J.L ECON. & ORG. 637 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Pre­
vention]. 
27. Id. at 640. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See id. at 641. 
31. See id. 
32 Id. at 649. 
33. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
34. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Interfinn Relationships and Infonnal 
Credit in Vietnam, 114 QJ. ECON. 1285 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, Interfinn 
Relationships]. 
35. See id. at 1299. 
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Given that they are locked together, people can learn to trust each 
other. Bilateral cooperation may evolve in relationships via a process 
in which the potential loss from having a trading partner defect is kept 
small in initial transactions and allowed to increase as the relationship 
progresses. Our Vietnamese managers described such a process. 
They said that they investigated potential trading partners before 
starting a trading relationship by talking with the customer's neighbors 
or other trading partners. But even with this pre-trading research, it is 
difficult for managers to identify trustworthy customers at the outset. 
Early in the relationship, the two sides of the trading relationship test 
each other. As trading continues, experience with the trading partner 
provides information. One manager explained that "[p]eople show 
their personality through their actions in difficult times," so after a few 
transactions this manager selected a few customers to concentrate 
on.36 The data show that longer-lasting relationships involve signifi­
cantly more trust. After two years of dealings, the amount of trade 
credit offered is on average fourteen percentage points higher than at 
the start of the relationship.37 
Also, given that they are locked in, the firms may be able to design 
the terms of each transaction so as to reduce the reliance on the 
shadow of the future by reducing either party's immediate temptation 
to renege. Setting the timing of payments right might achieve this, for 
example. If a manufacturer must make some initial specific invest­
ment in order to meet a buyer's needs, the gains from defection can be 
balanced by having the buyer pay part or all of the bill in advance of 
delivery. There is evidence that the Vietnamese firms structure their 
transactions in this way.38 
B. Multilateral Relational Contracting 
Bilateral relational contracting is not reliable if lock-in does not 
exist between the two trading partners. Relational contracting may 
still develop spontaneously, however, if community ties are strong 
enough. 
Communities of traders may derive social norms that encourage 
cooperation between any two of their members. Interviewing ranch­
ers in Shasta County, California, Robert Ellickson found that "most 
residents resolve trespass disputes not according to formal law, but 
rather, according to workday norms that are consistent with an over­
arching norm of cooperation among neighbors."39 Among the rural 
36. McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 652. 
37. See McMillan & Woodruff, Interftrm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1306. 
38. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 644-48. 
39. EWCKSON, supra note 6, at 48. 
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residents, interactions are frequent and residents expect them to con­
tinue indefinitely into the future. The conditions for cooperation in a 
repeated game are thus met. Similarly, merchants in Mexican 
California of the 1830s and 1840s, dealing with one another repeti­
tively, enhanced the effect of reputation by communicating their expe­
riences with one another.40 Given the small size of the community and 
the frequency of interactions, gossip sufficed to keep traders honest. 
Among New York City garment-manufacturing firms, interfirm rela­
tionships promote cooperation, and thus reduce transactional uncer­
tainty, facilitate the exchange of goods that are difficult to price, and 
enable the creation of agreements that are difficult to enforce contrac­
tually. These relationships often start from third-party referrals, and 
often are based on social relationships outside business.41 
Our data on Vietnamese firms show that network links among 
firms engender cooperation.42 We asked managers how they first 
learned about a customer before beginning to trade with it. If they re­
sponded that they found the customer through "other similar produc­
ers," "other suppliers," or business associations, we interpreted the 
two firms to be connected by a business network. One-quarter of the 
ongoing customer relationships in the sample were initiated through 
such business links. Connections significantly increased cooperation: 
a customer identified through a business network on average paid 
10% to 20% more of its bills after delivery than did a customer identi­
fied by other means.43 Similarly, in Africa, "firms that rely on informa­
tion sharing to screen prospective credit recipients sell an additional 
36% to 39% of their output on credit relative to others."44 
Social sanctions can add to, or replace, economic sanctions in 
helping to ensure cooperative behavior. Social norms and sanctions 
have particular force in ethnic networks - linked by ties of culture, 
language, or religion - because these networks possess the advantage 
of having a wider range of methods of influence at their disposal than 
do groups of merchants connected only by their commercial interests. 
For example, an ethnic network provided the backbone for the elev-
40. See Karen Clay, Trade without Law: Private- Order Institutions in Mexican 
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997). Arguably the fact that trade was based on the 
missions facilitated this process by limiting the number of sites for trade. 
41. See Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 674 (1996). 
42. See McMillan & Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1298. 
43. See McMillan & Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1306. 
44. Marcel Fafchamps, Ethnicity and Credit in African Manufacturing, 61 J. DEV. ECON 
205, 229 (2000). 
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enth-century Maghribi traders' coalition.45 In Asia and Africa, firms 
use ethnic ties to support transactions.46 
In the precommunist Vietnam of the 1960s, business among the 
merchants who were ethnic-Chinese (a well-defined category in 
Vietnam) "was based upon personal relationships and word-of-mouth 
agreements."47 If a merchant was untrustworthy, "it would be impos· 
sible for him to do business. Once the fact that a merchant had failed 
to honour his word became known, other merchants would simply ref· 
use to do business with him."48 These relationships were specifically 
ethnic-Chinese, and the inability of the ethnic-Vietnamese merchants 
to establish trust among themselves was alleged to explain their "lack 
of success in competing with the Chinese."49 
Among the present-day Vietnamese firms we surveyed, however, 
ethnic ties seemed less important. When asked how they first learned 
about a customer before beginning to trade with it, 17% identified 
family connections (a surprisingly small number given the conven­
tional views about the dependence of Asian business on family), but 
there was no significant extra amount of trust (as measured by trade 
credit) in those trading relationships. Furthermore, 18% of the man­
agers we interviewed said they could speak Chinese.50 If the existence 
of a Chinese ethnic network depends on this language ability along 
with the use of family connections, we found no significant tendency 
for family-based contracting to be used in transactions with a higher· 
than-average risk of reneging.51 
Table 1 summarizes some studies of spontaneous cooperation. 
These groups have several characteristics in common. They lack the 
ability to implement formal sanctions, such as fines, although they 
may, and generally do, rely on social sanctions as an enforcement 
mechanism. These social sanctions usually operate through ostraciz. 
ing or excluding members from the group. If this threat of exclusion is 
to shape behavior, there must be "social profits" from future interac· 
tion with the group, just as there must be economic profits for the 
threat of exclusion to have pecuniary penalties. This may be one rea· 
son that almost all of the groups on Table 1 are "closed" to the extent 
that membership is limited by ethnicity or geography. 
45. See Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 13, at 535-41. 
46. See generally JANET TAI LANDA, TRUsr, ETIINICITY, AND IDENTITY (1994); 
Fafchamps, supra note 44. 
47. Clifton A. Barton, Trust and Credit: Some Observations Regarding Business Strategies 
of Overseas Chinese Traders in South Vietnam, in 1 THE CHINEsE IN SOUTH VIE1NAM 53, 49 
(Lim & Gosling eds., 1983). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 651. 
51. See id. at 650-51. 
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TABLEl: SPONTANEOUSORDERING 
Reference orcen or One sided Information or 
Group Author Footnote c osed or two? coordination? 
Greif 




Social networks 26 Closed Two Information 
Business networks Open Two Information 
California Clay 
merchants (1997) 41 Closed Two Information 
Ellickson 
Shasta ranchers (1991) 6 Closed Two Information 
Singapore/Malaysia Landa 
Ethnic networks (1994) 47 Closed Two Information 
In sum, then, spontaneous relational contracting can work 
bilaterally if the two trading partners are locked in with each other. In 
the absence of lock-in, relational contracting requires the involvement, 
not just of the two parties to the transaction, but of a community of 
traders. Such community-based contracting can work spontaneously, 
based on social norms or on social or business networks, in close-knit 
communities with free flows of information. The market friction 
needed to support spontaneous relational contracting exists in transi­
tion economies such as Vietnam, which are characterized by thin mar­
kets and high transportation costs. As the private sector develops and 
infrastructure is improved, however, market friction decreases, mak­
ing spontaneous order harder to sustain. As this occurs, more formal 
systems of private ordering are necessary to sustain cooperation be­
tween trading partners. 
III. ORGANIZING PRIVATE ORDER 
In this Part, we review evidence from published anecdotes and 
from our own empirical studies that demonstrate how market players 
organize private order. As discussed above, private organizations 
serve two main functions in providing contract assurance: providing 
information about breaches, and coordinating responses (that is, sanc­
tions) to those breaches. 
A. Information Provision 
In open communities of traders where entry and exit are frequent, 
reliable information exchange is critical. How can new traders be­
come quickly informed about the reliability of trading partners? How 
can word about newcomers who cheat be spread quickly so that the 
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gains of cheating are minimized?s2 Numerous examples from diverse 
settings show how organized ordering increases the effectiveness of 
reputation in controlling behavior. 
Wholesalers of fresh fish in the United States used to suffer from 
buyers' failure to pay their bills.s3 Relationships consequently devel­
oped, so much so that one observer identified long-lasting bilateral 
relationships as the defining characteristic of the industry: "[D]ealers, 
wholesale firms and retail firms maintain longstanding ties to ensure 
steady supplies and customers."s4 Nevertheless, despite the preva­
lence of long-term relationships, "sharp practices are rife," according 
to a 1984 study by James Acheson. 
There are many stories in the industry about firms that have sent ship­
ments of lobsters to distant parts of the country and then have had great 
difficulties collecting their money. Other firms have sold lobsters to out­
of-state trucking firms for a good price only to find that the check was no 
good.ss 
The buyers could easily find other wholesalers to buy from, so they 
could get away without paying. Observing this, Neal Workman, an en­
trepreneur in Portland, Maine, formed a firm called GoFish to act as a 
debt-collection agency for the wholesalers. He soon realized that 
there was unused value in the information that he was gathering. 
"You can collect the bill once," he said. "You can sell the information 
about the guy that doesn't pay over and over and over."s6 GoFish be­
gan using the internet to provide fish wholesalers with credit informa­
tion about deadbeat buyers. This changed the industry. According to 
fish dealers, buyers now must pay their bills if they want to continue to 
buy fish. 
Two trade associations of footwear manufacturers in Mexico per­
form a similar role in regulating trade between manufacturers and re­
tailers. The associations are located in the cities of Leon and 
Guadalajara, which together account for three-quarters of the coun-
52. In an open network with no pre-screening, a trader will always be able to enter and 
cheat once. This could be prevented in two ways. First, there might be some profit from 
future trade within the network, giving an incentive for those who enter to remain after en­
tering. Alternatively, it may be profitable for the network to use courts to sanction cheaters 
even when the cost of doing so exceeds the recovery. That is, business networks or trade 
associations may gain a reputation for punishing defectors as a means of preventing defec­
tions. This could explain why (as shown in Part IV infra) business networks complement, 
rather than replace, courts in Eastern Europe. 
53. See James M. Acheson, The Social Organization of the Maine Lobster Market, in 
MARKETS AND MARKETING 105-51 (Stuart Plattner ed., 1990). 
54. Id. at 128. 
55. Id. at117. 
56. The GoFish story is on National Public Radio, Morning Edition, January 29, 1999, 
available at <http://npr.org/news/business/1999/Jan/990129.fish.htrnl> (visited September 21, 
2000). 
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try's manufacturing.57 They offer two related services. First, each re­
gional association maintains a database of information on the past be­
havior of retail clients of their members. Did the retailers pay their 
bills on time? Did they return an excessive amount of the merchan­
dise, claiming it was defective? Did they cancel orders at the last min­
ute, after goods had already been produced to fill them? A member 
receiving an order from a retailer with whom he has never worked can 
call the association and obtain a report on the retailer within 48 hours. 
Communication among manufacturers is made easier because they are 
geographically agglomerated. Second, both trade associations inter­
vene to resolve disputes between manufacturers and retailers. Law­
yers working for the associations travel regular routes throughout 
Mexico, visiting the retailers who owe money, and filing court cases if 
necessary.58 Representatives of the association in Leon, however, 
claim that most disputes are resolved with a telephone call to the re­
tailer. The association's power comes from its threat to put the re­
tailer on a "clients in default" list that is sent to association members 
every two months. These collection services complement the informa­
tion gathering, since manufacturers gain directly from reporting delin­
quent clients. Also, association lawyers traveling to collect accounts 
from one client will often gather information on other clients. This in­
formation is kept on file at the association and made available to 
members. 
In nineteenth-century Japan, contract-supporting information pro­
vision was one of the main functions of trade associations.59 The 
names of firms that reneged on agreements were posted on a black­
board for everyone to see, so cheating resulted in immediate loss of 
business. The courts were less effective then than they are now,60 but 
organized information gathering is not limited to environments in 
which courts are ineffective, and Japanese trade associations still per­
form the same function. During the recession of the early 1990s, 
wholesalers of heat-insulation materials faced an increase in fraudu-
57. See Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization in 
Mexico's Footwear Industry, 26 WORLD DEV. 979, 982 (1998). The associations were most 
effective when the market was closed to imports. For further discussion of this phenome­
non, see id. at 984-86. 
58. Using the courts in Mexico is possible, but problematic, according to manufacturers. 
First, the action must be filed in the city where the retailer does business. This makes delay 
tactics used by retailers' lawyers more costly. Second, judgments may be difficult to collect. 
One manufacturer recounted that he had been awarded the retailer's automobile by the 
court. However, since automobile titles were not registered electronically, there was no way 
to put a lien on the car. The retailer sold the car before he could take possession of it. The 
association representative reported that the most important role of the courts was to provide 
certification of the loss for tax purposes. 
59. See ULRIKE SCHAEDE, CoOPERATIVE CAPITALISM: SELF-REGULATION, TRADE 
AssOCIATIONS, AND TIIEANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN JAPAN at chs. 5 & 7 (2000). 
60. See id. at ch. 7. 
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lent activity, with checks bouncing and customers disappearing after 
receiving merchandise. To protect its members, the wholesalers' trade 
association created a list of all its members' potential customers, indi­
cating each one's creditworthiness. Dishonest companies were boy­
cotted. 
Credit bureaus similarly function as information repositories. For 
most consumers, the knowledge that failure to pay a bill would dam­
age their credit rating is sufficient incentive to ensure they pay their 
bills.61 
In the present-day Taiwanese footwear industry, trading compa­
nies act as a "hub of information regarding the managerial and finan­
cial condition" of manufacturers.62 The trading companies gather 
similar information about the demands and reliability of buyers in the 
United States and in Europe. Employees of a trading company often 
stay in the factories to monitor quality while an order is being pro­
duced. If disputes later arise between seller and buyer, the trading 
company then has the information it needs to judge which party is at 
fault. Are the goods defective, or is the buyer claiming a quality de­
fect to avoid paying for goods she has decided she doesn't want? The 
trading companies increase the effectiveness of reputation in two 
ways. First, since each trading company works with many manufac­
turers and many buyers, a manufacturer delivering merchandise late 
or of low quality will lose business with many clients all at once. Sec­
ond, other players in the industry learn which party was at fault in the 
dispute (so long as the trading company can be trusted to be a fair 
judge). Wholesalers and similar intermediaries perform similar func­
tions in other markets as well.63 
B. Coordination 
The separation of the two roles of private-order organizations -
information and coordination - is somewhat artificial. Since coordi­
nation requires information in the first place, organizations often do 
both. One can nonetheless independently assess whether the organi­
zation engages in coordination as well as information provision. In 
61. See generally Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of 
Credit Information Sharing, 4 ECON. & POL. 117 (1992). 
62. You-tien Hsing, Trading Companies in Taiwan's Fashion Shoe Networks, 48 J. INr'L 
ECON. 101, 106 (1998). Hubert Schmitz describes a similar role for wholesalers in Brazil's 
footwear industry. See Hubert Schmitz, Small Shoemakers and Fordist Giants: Tales of a 
Superc/uster, 23 WORLD DEV. 9, 14 (1995). 
63. Banks appear to operate in a similar manner in the market for Letters of Credit 
("LOCs"). According to Ronald Mann, sellers rarely comply strictly with the terms of 
LOCs. The buyer's bank, however, will pressure the buyer to pay so long as the breach is 
not material. Thus, payment through LOCs rests on the reputation of the bank rather than 
on the formal legal system. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment 
Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2494, 2525 (2000). 
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Section III.A, we discussed organizations whose functions seem lim­
ited to information provision. We now discuss organizations that ac­
tively coordinate their members' responses to breaches of agreements. 
Cooperation depends on history. If players have cheated each 
other in the past, they will tend to continue to cheat each other. Thus, 
cooperation requires coordinated action by all of the players to break 
out of a low-level equilibrium. The European car industry provides an 
example of a persistent inefficient equilibrium, and a coordinated at­
tempt to break out of it. A report sponsored by the U.K. government 
noted: "The mistrust which is in evidence is the result of many years 
of broken promises, abuse of confidence, and general acrimony in the 
industry."64 This was seen as raising the European industry's costs and 
harming its competitiveness against U.S. and Japanese imports. In 
1994, the two European trade associations, representing the car mak­
ers and the components suppliers, launched an initiative "aimed at 
improving the often hostile relations between the two sides of the mo­
tor industry."65 The guidelines sought more transparency in negotia­
tions over prices, greater cooperation in design and technology, and 
quality improvement. While it was accepted that the guidelines "could 
not give a legal or contractual definition to the relationship between 
vehicle-makers and component suppliers," they were intended to pro­
vide a "framework for cooperation."66 
Providing information about those who cheat may not suffice to 
deter cheating when punishment is costly - coordination may be re­
quired to prevent free riding.67 For example, in interviews conducted 
as part of our study of manufacturers in Vietnam, managers expressed 
some hesitancy to use their full arsenal of sanctions, in part because 
doing so would give them a reputation among their other customers of 
being difficult to deal with. "[K]eeping a good reputation is the most 
important thing," noted one manager.68 "[I]n Vietnam if you treat cus­
tomers fairly when they have difficulties you will have that reputation. 
People will do business with you because they think you will not kill 
them when they have difficulties."69 It is apparently not enough for 
the offended manager to determine whether the customer deliberately 
defected; it must also be clear to his other customers or potential cus­
tomers that the customer cheated. Managers expressed a similar con­
cern about hiring private agencies to collect unpaid bills. When a 




67. See supra Section I.B.2(a). 
68. McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 643. 
69. Id. 
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wholesaler owed one of our interviewees 60 million dong ($5,500), the 
interviewee considered hiring outside agents to collect his debt, but 
decided against it because it would have harmed his relationship with 
his other customers. He said, "in order to keep long-term relation­
ships with other customers, the firm must be very careful in dealing 
with disputes."70 
In the absence of an incentive to participate in sanctioning, free 
riding by traders weakens the ex ante incentive for cooperation. Pri­
vate organizations can coordinate sanctioning by punishing those who 
fail to carry out required punishments. An early mechanism for doing 
this was the medieval law merchant.71 Law merchants had the power 
to adjudicate disputes between trading partners, and set restitution to 
be paid by the party at fault. They kept records of defecting traders 
who had not made the payments set by the law merchant. This facili­
tated information transmission by providing a central location in 
which the past behavior of any potential trading partner could be 
checked. But this system is effective only if the traders stay informed 
by checking the status of each trading partner before trading with 
them and refusing to deal with those not in good standing. Otherwise, 
those who defect will not be fully sanctioned. Since checking on the 
status of each potential trading partner is a costly activity, traders had 
to be given an incentive not to free ride. Law merchants did this by 
establishing the rule that traders who failed to check on the status of a 
trading partner before transacting could not bring a case before the 
judge. This gave traders an incentive to stay informed, and ensured 
that the reputation of being a trader in good standing had more cur­
rency. 
Japanese banks use a clearinghouse to deter default.72 If a person 
or firm dishonors a note or check twice during a six-month period, all 
the financial institutions participating in the clearinghouse are re­
quired, by the rules of the clearinghouse, to suspend transactions with 
the defaulter for two years. Before the system was established in 1894, 
banks had a loose understanding that they would inform each other of 
defaults. The creation of the clearinghouse led to a substantial decline 
in default rates, showing that the spontaneous order that had prevailed 
evidently did not work as well as the organized private order of the 
70. Id. at 644. 
71. See Milgrom et al . ,  supra note 17. 
72 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of 
Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 110-11 (1991); Marc Ryser, Sanctions without 
Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine and Its Impact on Default Rates, in 
REPUI'ATION 225 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997). Ramseyer views the role of the clearinghouse 
as providing a commitment that the banks would actually carry out the prescribed punish­
ments (that is, in our terms, its role is coordination). Ryser views it as a repository of data 
about defaulters (that is, its role is information). As we have noted, the two roles are not 
mutually exclusive. 
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clearinghouse. The creation of the clearinghouse coordinated a shift 
to a new equilibrium, involving increased cooperation among the 
banks. The clearinghouse also helps address the free-rider problem 
involved in punishment by making it harder for banks to continue 
dealing with defaulters. Further, it serves as a repository of informa­
tion about defaulters.73 
Industry trade associations may coordinate the actions of their own 
members as well. The Fur Dressers' and Fur Dyers' Association pro­
vides one example of this.74 Operating in the United States in the 
early 1900s, the association consisted of thirty members who per­
formed 70% of the. cleaning and dyeing of fur pelts used in the manu­
facture of garments. Association members complained it was "general 
practice" for their clients (fur garment manufacturers) to claim that 
furs had been damaged in the dressing and dyeing process, and the 
damage claims were used to justify reductions in payments to dressers 
and dyers.75 The small size of the transactions and the difficulty in de­
scribing the agreed-upon quality level made use of the courts imprac­
tical in resolving the disputes. 
According to association bylaws, any manufacturer who did not 
pay the full amount demanded by a dresser and dyer after delivery of 
the merchandise was blacklisted directly by the harmed dresser/dyer. 
Association members agreed not to do business with a blacklisted cli­
ent unless they were paid in advance for services.76 Members of the 
trade association, who had to post bonds of $500 upon joining, were 
fined for any transactions with manufacturers currently blacklisted. 
These fines helped overcome free-rider problems and strengthened 
the enforcement mechanism. 77 
The ability of an individual member to blacklist, however, admits 
the possibility of extortion: a dresser and dyer could force a garment 
73. In its early days, the New York Stock Exchange certified the creditworthiness of 
traders on the exchange and judged disputes involving members and suspended members 
found at fault, according to Stuart Banner. It also filled a gap in the formal laws. Traders 
frequently engaged in "time bargains," or futures contracts, even though, until 1858, con­
tracts for the sale of stock that the seller did not own on the contract date were legally void 
in the state of New York, so these futures contracts were unenforceable in New York courts. 
The stock exchange took on the role of forcing traders to comply with their futures con­
tracts, with the penalty for breach being suspension or expulsion of members. See generally 
Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 
113 {1998). 
74. The association's activities are discussed in United States v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dy­
ers' Ass'n, 5 F.2d 869 (1925). This, and other similar cases, are also discussed in GEORGE P. 
LAMB & SUMNERS. KrlTELLE, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 96-105 {1956). 
75. See LAMB & KrrrELLE, supra note 74, at 100. 
76. In this case, the mannfacturer could make no ex post claim even if it were legitimate. 
77. In a closed commun ity, norms might be used to overcome problems with proper en­
forcement by members of the group. In Shasta County, Ellickson notes that "persons who 
respond [to transgressions] with excessive force" are themselves punished by the community. 
ELLICKSON, supra note 39, at 253. 
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manufacturer to pay in full even when there were legitimate reasons 
for a discount. Such an action, which would work to the detriment of 
the overall association, suggests the need for the association to moni­
tor its own membership as well. The monitoring might even be con­
ducted informally. For example, in Mexico, footwear manufacturers 
reportedly ignore complaints against retailers made by certain manu­
facturers because those manufacturers are themselves viewed as unre­
liable by the manufacturing community.78 
Some trade associations use more formal methods of monitoring 
their own members. The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Asso­
ciation, for example, formed a subsidiary called the Dress Control Re­
turns Bureau. The Bureau employed investigators to inspect all mer­
chandise returned to manufacturers by retailers and certify that each 
return was made because of legitimate quality defects.79 Retailers (cli­
ents) who returned merchandise for any reason other than legitimate 
quality defects, and who refused to pay for that merchandise, were 
blacklisted by the manufacturers' association. The members of the as­
sociation themselves were "coerced and compelled . . . to abide by 
rules and regulations . . .  under penalty of being required to pay . . .  
fines in a substantial amount of money."80 
Arbitration may also provide a method of enforcing standards and 
coordinating equilibria. For example, the New York Diamond 
Dealer's Club "facilitates the transmission of information about deal­
ers' reputations and, at least with respect to members, serves both a 
reputation-signaling and reputation-monitoring function."81 A typical 
transaction in the diamond industry involves the transfer between 
traders of bags of diamonds worth millions of dollars, but without any 
written contract. Upon joining the association, members must sign an 
agreement that they will submit all disputes to arbitration. The "Floor 
Committee" (the arbitral body) can exact a fine up to $1,000 and sus­
pend a member's trading privileges for twenty days. Both the amount 
of the fine and the rationale for reaching the decision are kept secret, 
78. See Woodruff, supra note 57, at 986. 
79. See Popular Priced Dress Mfg. Group, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1608 (1951). The association 
"employed and now employ[s], investigators to investigate the return by retailers of all la­
dies' dresses to the manufacturers thereof and to ascertain whether or not said returns are in 
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by . . .  [the] Popular Priced Dress 
Manufacturers Group, Inc . • . .  " Id. at 1612. 
80. In re Nat'! Coat & Suit Recovery Bd. 47 F.T.C. 1552 (1950). The Film Board of 
Trade carried out similar monitoring of their members. See United States v. First Nat'! Pic­
tures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 282 U.S. 44 (1930). The monitoring of mem­
bers in these cases may have extended beyond that needed for contract enforcement. Ac­
tions by these and other associations allowed under the National Industrial Recovery Act 
were later deemed to constitute restraint of trade. 
81. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 121 (1992). 
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but unpaid fines are posted.82 The arbitration board also has the 
power to suspend or expel a member from the association.83 
In the grain industry, the arbitration board of the National Grain 
and Feed Association indeed provides more effective enforcement of 
contracts (than do courts) for a novel reason, argues Lisa Bernstein. 
While courts search for "immanent business norms" to guide dispute 
settlements, the trade association arbitrators strictly apply the terms of 
the contract. This allows trading partners to structure contracts on 
two levels, with a set of rules ("norms") governing relationships in the 
cooperative phase, and a set of rules (contracts, or "end-game norms") 
governing relationships in the defection phase. These two sets of rules 
allow trading partners to sustain cooperation under a broader set of 
circumstances. The failure of the courts to more strictly enforce the 
contracts, on the other hand, undermines cooperation. In this exam­
ple, private ordering substitutes for the formal legal system not be­
cause it has a better understanding of industry practices, but because it 
has a better understanding of the theory of contract. 
* * *  
Table 2 summarizes cases of organized private ordering from the 
literature. The organized institutions divide along several characteris­
tics. Some institutions provide only information, while others sanction 
their own members for failure to sanction defectors. Those providing 
only information allow their members' trading partners more latitude 
to maintain strong relationships with some members even while they 
cheat others. Those that sanction their own members provide a 
stronger incentive for cooperation. 
82. According to Bernstein, the secrecy of the arbitration rulings enables a trader to 
"minimize the reputation cost of his breach." Id. at 126. Thus the fine imposed by the arbi­
trator is the sanction against defecting. Traders are not doubly punished by reputation sanc­
tions as well. 
83. See generally id. Numerous other trade associations provide arbitration services to 
their members. These associations generally have memberships comprised of traders on 
both sides of the transaction. Among these are the American Spice Trade Association and 
the National Grain and Feed Association. See HANDBOOK, BY-LAWS, AND CONTRACT 
RULES OF THE AMERI CAN SPI CE TRADE ASSOCIATION (1936). See also Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business 
Nonns, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1996). 
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TABLE 2: ORGANIZED INSTITUTIONS 
Reference orcen or One sided Information or 
Group Author Footnote c osed or two? coordination? 
Bernstein 
NGFA (1996) 84 Open Two Coordination 
Bernstein 
Diamonds (1992) 82 Closed Two Coordination 
Woodruff 
Mexican footwear (1998) 58 Open One Information 
Taiwan footwear 
Hsin� 




Closed Indepen- Coordination Japan mafia West 115 
(1999) dent 
Mil gr om/ 




Merchant Guild Milgrom/ 
Weingast 
115 Open One Coordination 
Banner 
NYSE (1998) 74 Open Two Coordination 
Japanese banking Ryser 
clearinghouse (1997) 73 Open One Coordination 
US trade associations (not previously published) 
Fur dressers/dyers 75 Open One Coordination 
Popular Priced 
Dress Association 80 Open One Coordination 
GoFish 57 Open One Information 
Note: Open means there are no significant restrictions to becoming a member of the institu-
tion; closed means there are significant restrictions. 
A second way in which the organized institutions differ is that 
some are primarily interested in actions that are verifiable, while oth­
ers are interested in actions that are observable to the parties involved 
in the transaction, but which are not verifiable by those outside the 
transaction. Credit bureaus and some trade associations, for example, 
are interested primarily in whether or not sellers actually deliver 
goods and buyers pay for them. Once the information is gathered, 
third parties can verify these actions by examining shipping receipts, 
canceled checks, and so on. Where courts function poorly, the trade 
associations reduce the cost of transmitting information about such 
behavior. 
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The trading companies in Taiwan and the arbitration boards at 
trade associations provide examples of institutions involved in dis­
putes that are observable but not verifiable. The Taiwanese trading 
companies, for instance, certify the quality of footwear delivered. 
Since the precise quality level agreed upon proves very difficult to 
write down, trading companies cannot provide information which al­
lows third parties not involved in the transaction to verify which party 
is at fault in a dispute. To be effective, then, the trading companies 
must have some incentive to be impartial in their judgments - and 
their own reputation in the market provides this. Two-sided member­
ship in trade association (that is, both buyers and sellers) may provide 
a similar incentive for fairness. 
IV. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORDER 
How does the presence of the legal system, or its absence, affect 
the operation of private-order mechanisms? In advanced economies 
with well-functioning legal systems, courts underpin existing private­
order mechanisms. Bargaining occurs in the shadow of the law; the 
law shapes agreements even if they operate without appealing to it. 
Even when it does not work well, a formal legal system can sometimes 
help spontaneous private order work. The ability to damage a trader's 
reputation works as a sanction even if the court's coercive enforce­
ment powers are weak. 
In China in the early 1990s, for example, lawyers who specialized 
in debt collection maintained good relations with the local press and 
would then threaten debtors with publicity.84 The unworkability of of­
ficial enforcement mechanisms meant that even the courts sometimes 
did this. Courts in the province of Heilongjiang, for example, threat­
ened newspaper exposure of debtors who failed to pay. This appar­
ently worked in the big cities, and particularly with enterprises wishing 
to protect a reputation they had built through expending huge sums of 
advertising money.85 
Private order can serve as either a complement to or a substitute 
for public order. Private order provides a complement (or a substi­
tute) to the law if an improvement in the law generates an increase (or 
a decrease) in the marginal value of private order. An improvement 
in the law will increase the use of complementary private-order 
mechanisms; it will similarly decrease the use of substituting private­
order mechanisms. Which type of private order exists in any given 
system is an empirical question. 
84. Private conversation with Donald C. Clarke, Professor of Law, University of 
Washington. 
85. Id. 
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Countries making a transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy provide an experimental forum to study how the various 
contract-assurance mechanisms interact. Certainly legal systems have 
been created there, and many companies indeed express faith in them, 
but trade associations, informal netWorks, wholesalers, and reputation 
also still have a profound effect on contracting. In this Part, we tum to 
evidence from a survey of manufacturing companies carried out in 
Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine.86 We use these 
survey data to determine whether a manager's use of social networks, 
business networks, wholesalers, and/or reputation depends on his faith 
in the ability of courts to enforce contracts with trading partners. 
A. The Data 
As determined by managers' perceptions, the courts in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union are more effective than those in 
Vietnam. The survey asked the managers about the ability of courts, 
other government agencies, or private parties to enforce contracts 
with customers and suppliers. Overall, just over two-thirds (68%) of 
those surveyed said courts could enforce contracts with customers. 
(Eighty-seven percent of the Romanian managers, 73 % of the Polish 
managers, 68% of the Slovakian managers, 56% of the Russian man­
agers, and 55% of the Ukrainian managers said the courts were effec­
tive.)87 This reflects a much higher confidence in the court system in 
these countries than exists in Vietnam.88 
Similarly, trade associations seem to underpin contracting in these 
countries more than they do in Vietnam. Although the survey gave us 
little direct indication of the role of organizations other than courts in 
contracting, overall two-fifths89 of the managers said they belong to 
trade associations that provide important services: information about 
the location of new suppliers and/or customers; information about the 
trustworthiness of suppliers and/or customers; or arbitration services. 
In Vietnam, by comparison, 26% of the firms belong to trade associa­
tions that offer some sort of contracting support.90 Wholesalers inter-
86. This survey asks questions similar to those asked in the Vietnam survey discussed 
above. See supra Part II. 
87. See Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts (Sept. 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts]. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 26 to 29. 
89. The actual numbers, by country, were 44% in Romania, 21 % in Poland, 23% in 
Slovakia, 60% in Russia, and 64% in the Ukraine. 
90. The membership percentage for Vietnam given here differs from that given in Sec­
tion II.A because we have included "information about new customers and suppliers" as 
contracting support. Just over 12% of the Vietnamese firms belong to a trade association 
providing information about new trading partners without providing the other contracting 
services. 
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mediate more a higher percentage of sales (10%) in Vietnam than in 
Romania (7%), Russia (5%), or Ukraine (4%). They are much more 
likely to intermediate transactions in the most advanced or the East­
ern European economies - Poland (26%) and Slovakia (19% ). With 
the possible exception of Vietnam, this ranking coincides with these 
countries' relative degrees of institutional development.91 
We find that both the courts and trade associations have a signifi­
cant effect on business trust in Eastern Europe. A firm that finds 
courts effective is on average 9% more likely to grant its customers 
trade credit than one that says the courts are ineffective. A firm that 
belongs to a trade association providing contract-supporting services is 
6% more likely to offer trade credit than one that does not.92 These 
numbers demonstrate the relevant role that these institutions play in 
providing contractual assurance. 
Spontaneous relational contracting also plays a significant role. 
From our data we can identify two types of relational contracting -
the use of social networks and the use of business networks. The sur­
vey asked a series of questions about the firms' longest-running and 
newest customer relationships, and also identified how the manufac­
turer first made contact with the customers identified in the survey. In 
particular, we know whether the trading partners are managed by 
family members or by people who were friends of the manufacturer 
before their trading relationship began. In both these scenarios we 
identify the relationship as one that arose from a social network. 
About 17% of the customer relationships arose from social networks.93 
Almost half ( 45%) of the time, however, initial information about cus­
tomers came from business networks - suppliers, other customers, or 
competitors of the manufacturer.94 Both social and business networks 
increase information flow and make sanctions possible. 
In addition to providing information about the ability to use formal 
institutions and to rely on networks for contractual assurance, the sur­
vey gives some indication about how well reputation functions. With 
respect to customers, manufacturers were asked: "If your company 
had a dispute with this customer, would other suppliers of this cus­
tomer find out about it?" and "If this customer had a dispute with an­
other firm, would your company find out about it?"95 
91. For evidence of these countries' relative institutional development by a variety of 
criteria, see Johnson et al., Entrepreneurs, supra note 3, at 4-13. 
92. See Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts, supra note 87. 
93. See id. 
94. Regardless of the initial source of information, 14% of the customers are identified 
as wholesalers. See id. 
95. Word gets around. In 28% of the relationships for which we have complete data 
{618 of2184), the manager said a customer's other suppliers would hear about a dispute. In 
39% (854 of2184), managers said they would hear about any transgressions of their custom­
ers. 
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We find that these forms of relational contracting, like the courts 
and trade associations, also have a significant effect on business trust. 
Customer lock-in matters: having one fewer competitor located 
nearby raises the probability of offering credit by 3%. More trust ex­
ists in longer-lasting relationships: three years after the start of a rela­
tionship, the probability of credit increases by 18%. Customers identi­
fied through business networks are 13% more likely to receive credit, 
and those identified through social networks are 14% more likely to 
receive credit, than customers identified without the help of net­
works.96 
B. The Interaction of Public and Private: Analyzing the Data 
We now use these data to ask how the courts, trade associations, 
informal networks, and reputation interact in supporting contracting. 
We do this with a series of regressions (reported in Table 3). We 
asked firms about both their oldest and newest customers, so the sam­
ple includes two observations per firm. The questions indicating 
membership in a trade association and belief in the effectiveness of 
courts relate to characteristics of the firm rather than of the individual 
relationships between the manufacturers and their customers. To cor­
rect for the biases in the standard errors created by the mismatched 
aggregation of data, we use a random-effects probit model. In addi­
tion to the variables of interest reported in Table 3, all the regressions 
include a set of variables which control for firm and manager charac­
teristics, and a series of dummy variables for each of eight industries in 
each of the five countries. These variables are described in the notes 
to Table 3. 
96. Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts, supra note 87. 
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TABLE 3: lNTERACTIONS OFUSE OFNETWORKS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Random Effects Probits - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Customer Customer Manufacturer Customer's Customer is 
identified identified Customer learns about other suppliers located 
by business by social is wholesaler customer's learn about in a different 
network network other disputes disputes city 
Courts are 0.172 -0.157 -0.035 -0.27 -0.073 -0.101 
effective (2.57) (1.93) (0.42) (3.59) (0.91) (1.38) 
Member of 
trade associa- 0.009 0.073 -0.188 0.227 -0.005 0.042 
ti on (0.14) (0.92) (2.18) (3.04) (0.07) (0.58) 
Customer 
identified 
through busi- 0.318 0.124 -0.195 
ness network (5.06) (1.92) (2.99) 
Customer 
identified 
through social 0.295 -0.099 -0.436 
network (3.42) (1.08) (4.62) 
Customer is -0.088 0.02 0.542 
wholesaler (1.02) (0.23) (6.25) 
Number of 
observations 2381 2381 2381 2184 2184 2231 
Note: Regressions also include three variables measuring characteristics of the firm's manager (age, years 
of schooling, and a variable indicating that the manager previously worked as a high-level manager 
in a state-owned enterprise), three variables measuring characteristics of the firm (log age of firm, 
log of the number of employees, and an indicator that the firm was started from scratch rather than 
spun off from a state-owned firm), and 39 industry/country dummy variables. 
Taking the manager's attitude toward the effectiveness of courts 
and membership in trade associations as given, we first ask how these 
affect the use of business networks, social networks, and wholesalers.97 
Managers who express confidence in the courts are more likely to use 
business networks and less likely to use social networks to identify cus­
tomers. The first effect is significant at the 0.01 level, the second at the 
0.10 level. Trade association members are less likely to have custom­
ers who are wholesalers. There is also a negative relationship between 
confidence in courts and the use of wholesalers, though this effect is 
97. Whether the manufacturer is a member of a trade association might also be taken as 
an endogenous variable, dependent on the ability to use courts. Given that a trade associa­
tion providing customer/supplier services exists in the manufacturer's industry, the manufac­
turer can choose whether to join or not. We find no significant relationship from belief in 
courts to membership in a trade association in the data (B= 0.019, t= 0.60, result not shown 
on table). It is also possible that belief in the effectiveness of courts is itself affected by 
membership in trade associations, or the use of business or social networks. We are unable 
to identify appropriate instruments in the survey to address this possibility. But the regres­
sions do include controls for variables that affect the ability to use courts, including the size 
and age of the firm, the age and education of the manager, and the industry and country in 
which the firm is located. 
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not statistically significant. These results suggest that firms use social 
networks and perhaps wholesalers as substitutes for courts, but use 
business networks in conjunction with courts. 
The amount of information a manufacturer possesses about his 
customers depends on how much effort the manufacturer expends on 
information gathering and on the difficulty of gathering that informa­
tion. Institutions like trade associations make information gathering 
less costly, leading to traders who are better informed about their 
trading partners' past behavior. We find that both trade associations 
and networks result in manufacturers' being better informed. Mem­
bers of trade associations are more likely to say that they would learn 
about their customers' disputes with other manufacturers, although 
not that the customers' other suppliers would learn about disputes. 
Manufacturers are also more likely to be better informed when the 
customers came from business or social networks. Manufacturers who 
believe that courts are effective, however, are less likely to say that 
they would know if their customers had disputes with other trading 
partners. 
Together, these results present a coherent picture. Trade associa­
tions and networks lower the cost of information gathering, resulting 
in better-informed manufacturers. Effective courts, on the other 
hand, lower the benefit of information gathering, resulting in less well­
informed manufacturers. Social networks and reputation appear 
therefore to serve as substitutes for functioning legal systems, while 
business networks function better when courts are effective. 
Whether the customers are located in the manufacturer's same 
city, in a different city in the same country, or in another country 
might affect contracting. Geographic distance adds to the complexity 
of relationships, making shipping, payment, quality inspection, and 
other issues more difficult. The last regression in Table 3 explores the 
use of public and private ordering to support trade over long distance. 
Both business and social networks are strongly and significantly asso­
ciated with trading locally, suggesting that geographic proximity 
makes reputation easier to communicate. 
We find no evidence that either courts or trade associations sup­
port long-distance trade. Those who believe courts are effective are 
more likely to trade locally, and those who are members of trade asso­
ciations are more likely to sell to distant buyers, but neither effect is 
significant. Long-distance trade is instead supported by wholesalers. 
Customers located in distant cities are much more likely to be whole­
salers than are local customers.98 Our data likely underestimate the 
98. The regressions use data for only two of the manufacturer's customers. Other data 
from the survey support the role of wholesalers in long-distance trade as well. We find a 
very strong positive correlation between the percentage of the manufacturer's overall sales 
that are made to wholesalers and the percentage of overall sales that are made outside the 
manufacturer's city ( = 0.21, p < 0.0001). 
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importance of wholesalers in supporting trade over distance, since 
wholesale customers located in the manufacturer's city likely sell some 
part of their purchases in distant cities. These sales would not show up 
as sales in distant cities in our data. Hence, while we find no correla­
tion between courts and trade associations, on the one hand, and sell­
ing over long distances on the other, we do find evidence of a strong 
role of wholesalers in supporting trade over long distances. This is the 
case even though wholesalers have not yet become a significant force 
in the five surveyed countries. Overall only 12% of manufacturers' 
sales are made through wholesalers. 
Finally, we consider what the data illustrate about when firms take 
their customers to court. The survey asked firms if a customer had 
ever failed to pay them or if a supplier had ever refused to accept the 
return of defective merchandise. The majority of firms (80%) re­
ported having had at least one such dispute with a trading partner, 
most of which (86%) involved a dispute with a customer. We focus 
here on the manufacturer-customer disputes.99 Courts were used in 
the resolution of 37% of these disputes.100 In 86% of the cases where 
the court was used, the relationship with the customer ended; the rela­
tionship ended only 53 % of the time when the court was not used. 
This difference may reflect the severity of the dispute. Manufacturers 
reported that the debt owed by the customer was collected in full in 
28% of the cases in which the court was involved and in 40% of the 
cases when the court was not used. On the other hand, the debt was 
written off completely 26% of the time when courts were used and 
only 12% of the time when courts were not used. This suggests either 
that courts are so ineffective as to be detrimental to recovery, or that 
the court was more likely to be used for more difficult disputes. 
Table 4 shows the results of probit regressions with actual use of 
the courts as the dependent variable. Here, we are most interested in 
knowing whether membership in a trade association, reliance on busi­
ness and social networks, use of wholesalers, and belief in the reputa­
tion mechanism are correlated with the decision to use courts. The re­
sults indicate that firms that are members of trade associations use 
courts more often, but the effect is not statistically significant. We do 
find evidence (consistent with the Table 3 results) that courts and 
reputation substitute for one another. Court use is less likely among 
firms who say that other suppliers of the customer would hear about 
disputes. (It is not clear in which direction the causation runs here.) 
99. The survey instrument used in Russia and the Ukraine does not allow us to deter­
mine whether the reported dispute was with a customer or a supplier. We therefore exclude 
the data from these two countries from the sample used in the regressions reported in Table 
4. 
100. The survey did not ask for what purpose courts were used. Thus, we do not know if 
courts helped resolve disputes, or simply certified losses. 
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Neither networks nor wholesalers have significant associations with 
court use.101 
The probit regressions in Table 4 include several other control 
variables. Not surprisingly, we find that court use is more likely 
among firms expressing a belief that courts are effective. The regres­
sions also control for how long the two firms had traded before the 
dispute arose, where the trading partner is located (in the same city as 
the manufacturer or not), and whether the trading partner is a private 
firm or a state-owned enterprise, as well as a set of manager and firm 
controls described in the notes to Table 4. Among these additional 
variables (which are not shown in the table), only the size of the inter­
viewed firm and the duration of the relationship before the dispute oc­
curred are significant. Larger firms are more likely to have used 
courts. Disputes are also more likely to end in court when the two 
trading partners had dealt with each other for a longer period of time 
before the dispute occurred, perhaps reflecting an increase in the 
complexity of trading relationships over time. The first regression 
controls for whether or not the two firms are still trading partners; the 
second regression removes this control. 
101. The lack of a significant association between networks and the use of courts may 
reflect the indirectness of our measure. We do not know how the customer involved in the 
dispute was identified, or whether this customer is a wholesaler. We know only whether the 
surveyed manufacturer used social and business networks to identify his oldest and newest 
customer, and the percentage of his sales that is made to wholesalers. Thus, our measures 
provide a noisy indication of the interaction between use of courts on the one hand and net· 
works and wholesalers on the other. 
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TABLE 4: PROBIT FOR USE OF COURT 
Did manufacturer use courts in 
most recent dispute with customer? 
Member of trade association 0.063 
(1.11) 
Reliance on business networks 0.002 
(0.05) 
Reliance on social networks -0.055 
(1.06) 
Percent of sales through whole- -0.0003 
salers 
(0.33) 
Manufacturer knows if customer 
has a dispute with another trading 0.023 
partner (0.60) 
Customer's other suppliers learn -0.081 
of disputes (2.04) 
Courts are effective 0.161 
(2.69) 
Relationship ended 0.421 
(7.86) 
Number of observations 499 

















Notes: Data for Poland, Slovakia and Romania only. Regressions also include 3 manager 
and 3 firm characteristics variables (see the note to Table 3 for a description), and 
variables measuring the duration of the relationship before the dispute occurred, a 
dummy indicating the trading partner is located in the same city, or is an SOE, and 
23 country/industry dummies. Reliance on social (business) networks is measured 
from 0 to 4 - the number of the 4 trading partners identified in the survey. The 
survey identifies the oldest and newest customer and the oldest and newest supplier. 
The three reputation measures are based on responses to questions related to the 
oldest and newest customer. 
* * *  
In sum, we find evidence from our survey of small-firm managers 
in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, the Ukraine, and Russia that social 
networks and reputation act as substitutes for effective courts. Manu­
facturers who reportedly find courts ineffective are more likely to use 
social networks to locate trading partners, and more likely to remain 
informed about the behavior of their trading partners. Trade associa-
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tions and business networks are also associated with a better flow of 
information about the behavior of trading partners. But rather than 
acting as substitutes for courts, business networks are more often used 
in concert with the legal system. 
V. THE DOWNSIDE OF PRIV ATE ORDER 
Private-order mechanisms have costs as well as benefits. Their dis­
advantages range from economic inefficiencies of exclusion and collu­
sion to social costs of racial discrimination and criminal violence. 
We have seen that private order can support exchanges when mar­
ket players cannot rely on the courts. Private order therefore pro­
motes economic efficiency by giving businesspeople the confidence to 
transact. But it also creates economic inefficiencies in two ways. First, 
spontaneous private order necessitates exclusion. The corollary of 
ongoing relationships is a reluctance to deal with firms outside the re­
lationship, and exclusion clearly can result in inefficiencies. Second, 
organized private order, changing the relative bargaining powers of 
buyers and sellers, can create the inefficiencies of monopolistic pric­
ing. 
Consider first the exclusion costs of spontaneous private order. 
Closed networks have an obvious drawback. Dealing only with a lim­
ited group limits private-sector growth. Entrepreneurial talent is 
wasted, as potentially productive entrepreneurs are prevented from 
setting up firms. Even if they can get started, efficient firms may be 
unable to grow, since potential new customers would not look beyond 
their current suppliers. 
The managers we interviewed in Vietnam and Eastern Europe ex­
pressed a hesitancy to deal with trading partners with whom they had 
never dealt. Regarding both their longest-term supplier and their 
newest supplier, manufacturers were asked: "If another firm you have 
never purchased from offered to supply this input for a price 10% less 
than your current supplier, would you purchase from the new firm?" 
Three possible answers were offered: buy entirely from the new sup­
plier, reject the new supplier, and buy from the new supplier but con­
tinue buying from the existing supplier as well. In Eastern Europe 
(Vietnam), only 38% (29%) of our respondents gave the response that 
simple economics would suggest, saying they would accept the bar­
gain; 45% (53%) said they would buy from the new supplier while 
continuing to buy at the higher price from their accustomed supplier; 
and 17% (19%) said they would reject the lower-priced offer outright. 
In evaluating these responses, the success of the relationship must 
be weighed against the failure of the market. In a (hypothetical) mar­
ket with perfect information and complete contracting, the buyer 
would have no reason to be suspicious of a low-priced offer, and 
would always accept it. If there is uncertainty about the reliability of 
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the new supplier, however, it could be rational to reject the apparently 
better deal. This situation could arise in any economy, but is espe­
cially likely when the law is dysfunctional. Firms' unwillingness to 
take the risk of working with a new supplier, even for a much lower 
price, however, sometimes means foregoing a genuinely better deal. 
The fact that only 29% of our respondents said they would switch to 
buying from a new supplier offering a 10% lower price implies that 
considerable inefficiencies exist in this market. 
How do courts and informal contract enforcement affect a firm's 
willingness to switch suppliers? Controlling for the complexity of the 
good produced, regressions using the data discussed in Part IV show 
that those who find courts effective are 6% less likely to reject the deal 
outright, and those who are members of trade associations are 9% less 
likely to reject the deal outright. Business networks have no signifi­
cant effect on the propensity to switch. But where the initial contact 
came through social networks, we find some evidence that manufac­
turers are more likely to reject the new deal completely. Rejecting the 
deal is also more likely when the manufacturer's "other suppliers 
would learn about a dispute with this supplier."102 We conclude that 
social networks and reputation have a dampening effect on market 
forces. 
How does public order or organized private order affect the exclu­
sionary costs of spontaneous private order? We showed in the regres­
sions reported in Table 3 that market players will more likely use so­
cial networks and reputation when they cannot rely on the courts. 
These mechanisms, however, exact the highest cost in terms of ex­
cluding potentially efficient new entrants. Trade associations have fa­
vorable effects, and informal business networks negligible effects, on 
exclusion. But the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that firms use 
business networks and, to a lesser extent, trade associations in con­
junction with courts. Thus, while firms may find substitutes for dys­
functional legal systems, public policy should not equally encourage all 
of these substitutes. 
The exclusion costs of spontaneous private order arise in bilateral 
relationships with lock-in or in closed networks, such as ethnic or so­
cial groups, where entry and exit are inherently difficult or impossible. 
Exclusion costs do not exist in open networks that allow entry and 
exit, such as networks of firms in a similar line of business. But in 
open networks, private order must be organized. Organized private 
order can give rise to another kind of economic inefficiency by push­
ing the bargaining power of sellers and buyers out of balance. 
Exclusion obtained through continued dealings with the same 
trading partners and reliance on social connections sometimes results 
102. McMillan & Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1308; Johnson et 
al., Courts and Contracts, supra note '67, at Table 6. 
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in more than missed business opportunities; it can result in discrimina­
tion against certain groups in society.103 In Kenya and Zimbabwe, 
firms' reliance on the existing networks, while arguably done simply to 
facilitate contracting and not to express any preference for discrimina­
tion, nevertheless creates ethnic and gender bias.104 In the white­
dominated New York construction industry, African-American con­
tractors attempting to break in are reportedly hindered by the existing 
social ties.105 One entrepreneur complained that he could not win con­
tracts because he was "not in the social circles where those kinds of 
deals are made"; he could not "play golf or go on boats with peo­
ple."106 
In addition, the ability to organize contract enforcement some­
times becomes the ability to collude. "Merchants of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but the con­
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contriv­
ance to raise prices," according to Adam Smith's famous dictum.107 
Private-order organizations that share information about customers 
and coordinate firms' actions will find it relatively easy to fix prices. 
In Japan, for example, firms regularly use trade associations to organ­
ize price-fixing conspiracies, to the cost of their customers.108 
The extent of price-fixing power depends on the nature of the pri­
vate-order organization. Some private-order organizations are neutral 
intermediaries, favoring neither buyers nor sellers. The medieval law 
merchants,109 the Taiwanese trading companies,110 and the New York 
diamond-traders association111 provide examples of this. These in­
clude both buyers and sellers as members or as clients. Some of these 
are constrained, moreover, by facing competition from other organiza­
tions performing similar functions; the Taiwanese trading companies 
provide an example of this. Other private-order organizations, how­
ever, are one-sided, favoring (usually) sellers over buyers. The medie-
103. See Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Per­
sistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1996). 
104. See Fafchamps, supra note 44, at 205. 
105. See Alejandro Portes & Patrica Lanolt, The Downside of Social Capital, AM. 
PROSPECT, May-June 1996, at 18. 
106. Id. at 20. 
107. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN ENQUIRY INTO TIIE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 144 (1976). 
108. See Schaede, supra note 59, at ch. 3 & ch. 5; John McMillan, Dango: Japan's Price-
Fixing Conspiracies, 3 ECON. & POL 201 (1991). 
109. See Milgrom et al., supra note 17. 
110. See Hsing, supra note 62. 
111. See Bernstein, supra note 81. 
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val guilds,112 the Japanese bank clearinghouse, the Fur Dressers' and 
Fur Dyers' Association, and other US trade associations discussed in 
Section III.B above, and the Mexican shoe-industry association pro­
vide examples of this. 
In one sense, a one-sided association has an incentive to promote 
contracting efficiency because it furthers the interest of even a one­
sided association for its members to be able to credibly make prom­
ises. Firms can generally structure contracts so that either side re­
ceives most of the gain from defecting. In Mexican footwear, for ex­
ample, retailers could pay at the time orders are placed. This would 
put the burden of cooperation on the manufacturer rather than the re­
tailer. Since the manufacturers are organized, and a retailer's reputa­
tion spreads more quickly, having the retailer move last (that is, pay 
after delivery) makes cooperation easier to sustain. 
That industry associations may go beyond contract enforcement to 
coalitional bargaining helps answer a puzzle: Why might wholesalers 
replace trade associations in ensuring cooperation? At first glance, 
wholesalers are at a disadvantage. They have no direct sanctions. 
Moreover, because they represent only a portion of the buyers and 
sellers, they are less effective in transmitting information than an asso­
ciation comprised solely of one side of the transaction. But competi­
tion among wholesalers gives them an incentive to be fair and honest. 
Those with reputations for fairly arbitrating disputes between buyers 
and sellers will see their business grow and their profits increase. 
Competition gives the middlemen stronger incentives than a monopo­
listic trade association to monitor the suppliers and clients they deal 
with (their "members") and to be honest in arbitrating disputes be­
tween suppliers and clients. 
The downside of private order goes farther than discrimination or 
mere economic inefficiencies. A corollary of private order in some 
cases is socially destructive activities. Private-order organizations usu­
ally limit their sanctioning techniques to boycotting offenders, but 
sometimes effective contract enforcement needs stronger sanctions. 
In situations involving a large initial investment with a long-delayed 
return, for example, the shadow of the future may not be strong 
enough to deter reneging. In the absence of a functioning legal sys­
tem, then, private-order organizations might be tempted to expand 
their enforcement techniques. Some private-order organizations use 
threats of physical violence. The Sicilian and Russian Mafias, for ex­
ample, offer contract-supporting services, but a lot else besides.113 Or-
112. See Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of 
the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994). 
113. See generally DIEGO GAMBEITA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA (1993); Avner Greif & 
Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status 
in Russia, in ECONOMIC TRANsmoN IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALmES OF 
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ganized crime, according to Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, "is the 
dark side of private ordering - an entrepreneurial response to ineffi­
ciencies in the property rights and enforcement framework supplied 
by the state."114 We thus need public order to limit these abuses of 
private order. 
VI. SUMMARY 
People's concern for their own reputation can support contracting 
between a pair of trading partners when one or both are locked in, and 
among multiple trading partners in close-knit communities where in­
formation flows freely. In countries making a transition from planned 
to market economies, such spontaneous private ordering substitutes 
for the lack of functioning legal systems. The underdevelopment of 
the private sector makes cooperation easier to sustain by locking 
trading partners together. The market frictions fall as the private sec­
tor develops, creating the need for more formal contract enforcement. 
In communities where people can hide behind their anonymity, 
private order, if it is to operate at all, must be organized. Private­
order organizations in notably diverse settings, from medieval Europe 
to present-day Mexico, work in similar ways. An organization such as 
a market intermediary or a trade association disseminates information 
about contractual breaches and coordinates the community's response 
to breaches. The usual sanction is to boycott the offender. 
The data from our survey of firms in five transition economies in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union show that social net­
works and informal gossip substitute for the formal legal system, while 
business networks and trade associations work in conjunction with the 
formal legal system. 
While private order fosters economic efficiency by making gains 
from trade realizable, it sometimes also harms efficiency by excluding 
new entrants from trading or by achieving price collusion. Private or­
der can cause racial or gender discrimination. Some private-order or­
ganizations' enforcement techniques overflow into criminal violence. 
Private order can usefully supplement public law, but cannot replace 
it. 
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